Primate cognition

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Primate cognition deals with the cognitive abilities of primates. Traditionally humans were thought to be completely different from other animals, Darwin may have been the first to think otherwise when he jotted in his notebook:

Origin of man now proved. Metaphysic must flourish. He who understands baboon would do more for metaphysics than Locke.

—Charles Darwin, 1838^[1]

Primates are capable of high levels of cognition; some make tools and use them to acquire foods and for social displays;^[2][3] some have sophisticated hunting strategies requiring cooperation, influence and rank;^[4] they are status conscious, manipulative and capable of deception;^[5] they can recognise kin and conspecifics;^[6][7] they can learn to use symbols and understand aspects of human language including some relational syntax, concepts of number and numerical sequence.^[8][9][10]

Contents 1 Studies in primate cognition 1.1 Theory of mind 1.2 Language 1.3 Tool use 1.4 Problem solving 2 See also 3 References 4 Further reading

[edit] Studies in primate cognition

[edit] Theory of mind

Premack and Woodruff's 1978 article "Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?" was a contentious issue because of the problem of inferring from animal behavior the existence of thinking, of the existence of a concept of self or self-awareness, or of particular thoughts.

Non-human research still has a major place in this field, however, and is especially useful in illuminating which nonverbal behaviors signify components of theory of mind, and in pointing to possible stepping points in the evolution of what many claim to be a uniquely human aspect of social cognition. While it is difficult to study human-like theory of mind and mental states in species which we do not yet describe as "minded" at all, and about whose potential mental states we have an incomplete understanding, researchers can focus on simpler components of more complex capabilities. For example, many researchers focus on animals' understanding of intention, gaze, perspective, or knowledge (or rather, what another being has seen). Part of the difficulty in this line of research is that observed phenomena can often be explained as simple stimulus-response learning, as it is in the nature of any theorizers of mind to have to extrapolate internal mental states from observable behavior. Recently, most non-human theory of mind research has focused on monkeys and great apes, who are of most interest in the study of the evolution of human social cognition.

There has been some controversy over the interpretation of evidence purporting to show theory of mind ability—or inability—in animals. Two examples serve as demonstration: first, Povinelli et al. (1990)^[11] presented chimpanzees with the choice of two experimenters from which to request food: one who had seen where food was hidden, and one who, by virtue of one of a variety of mechanisms (having a bucket or bag over his head; a blindfold over his eyes; or being turned away from the baiting) does not know, and can only guess. They found that the animals failed in most cases to differentially request food from the "knower." By contrast, Hare, Call, and Tomasello (2001)^[12] found that subordinate chimpanzees were able to use the knowledge state of dominant rival chimpanzees to determine which container of hidden food they approached.

Tomasello and like-minded colleagues who originally argued that great apes did not have theory of mind have since reversed their position. Povinelli and his colleagues, however, maintain that Tomasello's group has misinterpreted the results of their experiments. They point out that most evidence in support of great ape theory of mind involves naturalistic settings to which the apes may have already adapted through past learning. Their "reinterpretation hypothesis" explains away all current evidence supporting attribution of mental states to others in chimpanzees as merely evidence of risk-based learning; that is, the chimpanzees learn through experience that certain behaviors in other chimpanzees have a probability of leading to certain responses, without necessarily attributing knowledge or other intentional states to those other chimpanzees. They therefore propose testing theory of mind abilities in great apes in novel, and not naturalistic settings. Kristin Andrews takes the reinterpretation hypothesis one step further, arguing that it implies that even the well-known false-belief test used to test children's theory of mind is susceptible to being interpreted as a result of learning.

[edit] Language

The modeling of human language in animals is known as animal language research. Nim Chimpsky, a chimpanzee, was successfully taught 125 signs during his life, though some disagree that this really constituted language. There have been other, more successful animal language projects.

[edit] Tool use

Research in 2007 shows that chimpanzees in the Fongoli savannah sharpen sticks to use as spears when hunting, considered the first evidence of systematic use of weapons in a species other than humans.^[13][14]

[edit] Problem solving

In 1913, Wolfgang Köhler started writing a book on problem solving titled The Mentality of Apes (1917). In this research, Köhler observed the manner in which chimpanzees solve problems, such as that of retrieving bananas when positioned out of reach. He found that they stacked wooden crates to use as makeshift ladders, in order to retrieve the food. If the bananas were placed on the ground outside of the cage, they used sticks to lengthen the reach of their arms. Köhler concluded that the chimps had not arrived at these methods through trial-and-error (which American psychologist Edward Thorndike had claimed to be the basis of all animal learning, through his law of effect), but rather that they had experienced an insight (also sometimes known as an “aha experience”), in which, having realized the answer, they then proceeded to carry it out in a way that was, in Köhler’s words, “unwaveringly purposeful.”

[edit] See also

• Animal cognition
• Hominid intelligence
• Great ape language
• Primate empathy
• Chimpanzee intelligence

[edit] References

[edit] Further reading

• Gouteux, S., Thinus-Blanc, C. and Vauclair, J. (2001). Rhesus monkeys use geometric and nongeometric information during a reorientation task. Journal of Experimental Psycholog: General, 130 (3), 505-519.

• Call, J. (2001). Object permanence in orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus), chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), and children (Homo sapiens). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 115 (2), 159-171.

• De Blois, S.T., Novak, M.A. and Bond, M. (1998). Object permanence in orangutans (Pongo pygmaues) and squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 112 (2), 137-152.

• Neiworth, J.J., Steinmark, E., Basile, B.M., Wonders, R., Steely, F. and DeHart, C. (2003). A test of object permanence in a new-world monkey species, cotton top tamarins (Saguinus Oedipus). Animal Cognition, 6, 27-37.

• Westergaard, G.C., Lundquist, A.L., Haynie, M.K., Kuhn, H.E. and Suomi, S.J. (1998). Why some capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) use probing tools (and others do not). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 112 (2), 207-211.

• Brown, D.A. and Boysen, S.T. (2000). Spontaneous discrimination of natural stimuli. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 114 (4), 392-400.

• Neiworth, J.J., Parsons, R.R. and Hassett, J.M. (2004). A test of the generality of perceptually-based categories found in infants: Attentional differences toward natural kinds by New World monkeys. Developmental Science, 7, 185-193.

• Paar, L.A. and de Waal, F.B.M. (1999). Visual kin recognition in chimpanzees. Nature, 399, 647.

• Fujita, K., Watanabe, K., Widarto, T.H. and Suryobroto, B. (1997). Discrimination of macaques by macaques: The case of sulawesi species. Primates, 38 (3), 233-245.

• Paar, L.A., Winslow, J.T., Hopkins, W.D. and deWaal, F.B.M. (2000). Recognizing facial cues: Individual discrimination by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 114 (1), 47-60.

• Pascalis, O. and Bachevalier, J. (1998). Face recognition in primates: A cross-species study. Behavioural Processes, 43, 87-96.

• Paar, L.A., Winslow, J.T., and Hopkins, W.D. (1999). Is the inversion effect in rhesus monkeys face-specific? Animal Cognition, 2, 123-129.

• Uller, C., Hauser, M. and Carey, S. (2001). Spontaneous representation of number in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus Oedipus). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 115 (3), 248-257.

• Beran, M.J. (2001). Summation and numerous judgments of sequentially presented sets of items by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 115: 181-191.

• Hauser, M.D., Kralik, J., Botto-Mahan, C., Garrett, M. and Oser, J. (1995). Self- recognition in primates: Phylogeny and the salience of species-typical features. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 92, 10811-10814.

• Heyes, C.M. (1995). Self-recognition in primates: Further reflections create a hall of mirrors. Animal Behavior, 50, 1533-1542.

• Anderson, J.R. and Gallup, G.G. (1997). Self-recognition in Saguinus? A critical essay. Animal Behavior, 54, 1563-1567.

• Hauser, M.D. and Kralik, J. (1997). Life beyond the mirror: A reply to Anderson and Gallup. Animal Behavior, 54, 1568-1571.

• Neiworth, J.J., Anders, S.L., and Parsons, R.R. (2001). Tracking responses related to self- recognition: A frequency comparison of responses to mirrors, photographs, and videotapes by cotton top tamarins (Saguinus Oedipus). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 115 (4), 432-438.

• De Waal, F.B.M., Dindo, M., Freeman, C.A., & Hall, M.J. (2005). The monkey in the mirror: Hardly a stranger. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 102, August, 2005, 11140-11147.

• Anderson, J.R.,and Mitchell, R.W. (1999). Macaques but not lemurs co-orient visually with humans. Folia Primatol, 70, 17-22.

• Itakura, S. and Tanaka, M. (1998). Use of experimenter-given cues during object-choice tasks by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), an orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus), and human infants (Homo sapiens). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 112 (2), 119-126.

• Neiworth, J.J., Burman, M.A., Basile, B.M. and Lickteig, M.T. (2002). Use of experimenter-given cues in visual co-orienting and in an object-choice task by a new world mokey species, cotton top tamarins (Saguinus Oedipus). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 116 (1), 3-11.

• Tomasello, M., Call, J. and Hare, B. (1998). Five primate species follow the visual gaze of conspecifics. Animal Behavior, 55, 1063-1069.

• Brosnan, S.F. & de Waal, F.B.M. (2003). Monkeys reject unequal pay. Nature, 425 (September), 297-299.

• De Waal, F.B.M. & Davis, J.M. (2003). Capuchin cognitive ecology: cooperation based on projected returns. Neuropsychologia, 41, 221-228.